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The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God 
is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of 
Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology 
proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God 
based on his Summa Theologica (henceforth, ST) since such belief is 
evidence itself from his De Veritate (henceforth, Dv), there is sufficient 
evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total 
rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such 
belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, 
Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. 
Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification 
negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said 
justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for 
belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence 
is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient 




One of the highly contentious topics in contemporary epistemology of religion 
is the status of evidence as a justification for belief in God. Two schools of thought 
propound completely opposing views regarding evidence—theistic evidentialism and 
reformed epistemology. On the one hand, Richard Swinburne (1996, 114) argues that 
there is evidence that “gives a significant degree of probability” that justifies belief in 
God. On the other hand, Alvin Plantinga (1983, 91), the strongest proponent of 
reformed epistemology, argues that evidence is not needed to justify belief in God 
because such belief is properly basic “grounded in justification-conferring conditions.” 
This opposition, roughly speaking, is the present-day tug of war between faith and 
reason, between fideism and rationalism.1  
Thomas Aquinas, in his religious epistemology, appears to agree with the two 
schools of thought.  Edmond Eh (2015, 33) argues that “in [St. Thomas’s] account of 
religious knowledge by faith argues that evidence is unnecessary for religious beliefs. 
However, in his account of religious knowledge by science, he argues that there is 
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evidence for religious beliefs.” Meaning, while evidence is not a necessary condition 
for belief in God, there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief.  
I advance two points in this paper. First, following Thomas Aquinas’ 
understanding of evidence in relation to belief in God, I claim that Plantinga’s total 
rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely 
subjective.  To justify this purely subjective belief, he introduces the notion of 
justification-conferring conditions. Second, I argue that Plantinga’s notion of 
justification-conferring conditions negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic 
because the said conditions seem to function as an evidence for the said belief. I 
accordingly divide the discussion into four parts: the first deals with Thomas Aquinas’ 
religious epistemology; the second deals with Plantinga’s reformed epistemology 
focusing on his notion of proper basicality; the third deals with his justification-
conferring conditions; and the last part is my critique of Plantinga’s claim that belief 
in God is properly basic.    
 
THOMAS AQUINAS’ TWO FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOD  
 
Knowledge of God by Faith 
 
For Thomas Aquinas (Dv q.14, a. 2, ad. 15), faith is knowledge of objects which 
are not seen in which “the intellect of the believer is determined to [assent] to one object, 
not by reason, but by the will” (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 1 & 3). Its content is not 
demonstrated by natural reason but is induced in the believer (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 1). 
The act of faith has three different relations to its object—God. First, as regards the 
material object of faith, “an act of faith is ‘to believe in a God’” (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 2, co.). 
Second, as regards the formal aspect of the object, “an act of faith is ‘to believe God’” 
(ST II-II, q. 2, a. 2, co). Third, “if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect 
is moved by the will, an act of faith is to believe in God” (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 2, co).      
Here, knowledge—or belief in God—is gained by the assent of the intellect 
determined by the will. This assent is “moved by the grace of God” (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 
9, co.). Through this grace, “the believer has sufficient motive for believing” (ST II-II, 
q. 2, a. 9, co., ad. 3). The justification of the sufficiency of motive cannot be fulfilled 
by external proofs—provided that grace in this kind of knowledge is an epistemic 
(therefore, internal) assistance from God—but by freewill, since the believer can 
choose—or not choose—to assent to the object of faith (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9, co., ad. 2). 
Hence, the believer is not obligated to justify her/his faith in God materially because 
she/he freely chooses to believe in God. 
The choice to believe is “to think with assent.” This choice or thinking with 
assent is proof that “one chooses to give intellectual assent to something with 
certainty” (Eh 2015, 36). What validates this certainty is faith itself because, in its own 
right, it is an evidence (Dv q. 14, a. 2, ad. 9). For Thomas Aquinas, faith can be called 
evidence in four ways. First, faith can rightly be considered as evidence because 
“reason assents to something because it was said by God.” Implied in this assent is the 
authority of the speaker, who is God. Second, faith can be called as evidence insofar 
as the said faith acts as a means to prove God’s existence. Third, “faith is a brief 
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foretaste of the knowledge which we shall have in the future.” Fourth, “faith is 
evidence with reference to the light of faith through which we know what is to be 
believed” (Dv q. 14, a. 2, ad. 9).  
The four ways epistemically show that faith— knowledge of objects which are 
not seen— proves God’s existence. In short, there is faith because God truly exists. 
Knowledge by faith functions as a medium through which God is thought to be truly 
existing. Faith is an epistemic bridge between human rationality and God. The 
certainty of this kind of knowledge rests on the truthfulness of God as its object. The 
free assent of the believer is her/his cooperation with the epistemic aid provided by 
God himself in the form of grace, as noted by Thomas Aquinas.          
 
Knowledge of God by Science 
 
For Thomas Aquinas (ST I, q. 84, a. 1, s. c.), “science is in the intellect.” This is 
so because the bodies that are in a continual state of flux “cannot be grasped with any 
degree of certitude” (ibid.). In science, there are two dimensions of human knowledge: 
the sensible knowledge and the intellectual knowledge  (ST I, q. 85, a. 3., co.). The object 
of the former is singular and individual, while the object of the latter is universal. Sensible 
knowledge comes before intellectual knowledge. Through abstraction— the operation 
of the intellect to form a universal concept after the actual sensation—the soul [through 
the intellect] “knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor 
through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, 
which can be in the soul by their own essence” (ST I, q. 84, a. 1, ad. 1).  
In this paradigm, the soul’s intellect has the power to access the essence of 
things. The intellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing” 
(ST I, q. 84, a. 8, co.). However, “the suspension of the senses necessarily involves a 
hindrance to the judgment of the intellect” (ST I, q. 84, a. 8, co., ad. 1). Meaning, while 
the intellect knows more perfectly than the senses, the former cannot operate without 
the data provided by the latter. The complementary relationship between the two 
dimensions of knowledge will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs.   
 
The Sensitive Dimension of Human Knowledge 
 
The essence of the knowledge of God by science is reasoning (ST I, q. 85, a. 5, 
co.). The first step of knowing is external sensation. By external sensation, we mean 
“the soul senses nothing without the body because the action of sensation cannot 
proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ” (ST I, q. 77, a. 5, ad. 3) through its 
five exterior senses: sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. This is the first phase in the 
human cognitive process in which cognitive, physical act is caused by a stimulus. This 
is the immediate contact of the concrete. The stimuli excite the organs causing the latter 
to transmit raw information to the central nervous system. When sensibility works, 
individuated by the different sense organs such as nose, ears, eyes, and the like, the 
physical contact excites the nervous system. For example, when one smells something 
bad, the smell itself is the stimulus, while “smelling something bad” is the excitation. 
The immediate reaction of the brain is the sensation. It is the actual here and now. 
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During sensation, the mind is not involved yet because the body is about to relay sense 
data to it in a split second.   
Next is internal perception. Internal perception “is the power that preserves the 
sense data …where their forms are apprehended” in the soul (ST I, q. 78, a. 4). These 
inchoate forms are called phantasms which are organized in such a way that each datum 
is placed accordingly. Here, the mind actively puts everything received from the actual 
sensation in order. Ramon Lucas (2005, 113-117), in trying to illustrate how internal 
perception operates, uses some vague black and white images of children, buildings, and 
beds.  No matter how vague these images are, the mind can still figure out what the 
images really depict. This is what internal perception does with the data provided by the 
actual sensation. Internal perception puts everything in order in such a way that the data 
can still be well known though they are presented to us vaguely in some instances. 
 
Intellectual Dimension of Human Knowledge  
 
Next is conceptualization. Here, the intellect “makes things actually intelligible, 
by abstraction of the species from material conditions” (ST I, q. 79, a. 3).  After sensation, 
the mind starts to organize the details which the phantasms provide. Phantasms are data 
that are taken from the actual sensation. Through these, the mind forms concepts that are 
immaterial and unchangeable which correspond to particular things. The mind abstracts 
the universal, which applies to the same particular beings actually sensed. Thus, the 
concept of a horse applies to all horses because the phantasms being provided are the 
representations of the same bodies that do not change the moment they are 
conceptualized. That is why, no matter how one revises the actual image of a horse, be 
it a paper horse, actual horse, painting of a horse, clay horse, and the like, the “horseness” 
of these material horses is still the same, i.e., universally unchangeable.  
Then follows judgment. Through judgment, the mind affirms or denies what is 
conceptualized. While conceptualization is the acquisition of some raw images 
provided by phantasms, judgment “answers the question, ‘Is it so?’”  When we see a 
thing, and when that thing corresponds to the criteria of being a bird, then we judge, 
“This is a bird.” Affirmation and negation of what is conceptualized depend on the fact 
that “that thing is not this thing.” Background knowledge has a strong influence on the 
knowing process; that is why strong judgment requires much experience. 
The culmination of the process of knowing is reasoning. Reasoning is our “power 
to move from understanding to inquiry, discovery, analysis, and judgment” (ST I, q. 79, 
a. 8). Reasoning is “a physical activity of the cognitive order whose end is to formulate 
judgment…by reason of a necessary connection between the truths presupposed by the 
judgments given and the new judgment that it is going to formulate” (Lucas 2005, 144-
145). It is the capacity of the mind to formulate some judgments in order to arrive at some 
truths. Thus, the aim of reasoning is to provide ideas that will support what is claimed to 
be true. Reasoning shows the connection between concepts in a discursive way. 
 
Evidence for God’s Existence 
 
Following the complementary relationship between the sensitive and 
intellectual dimensions of knowledge, Thomas Aquinas (ST I, q. 12, a. 1, co.) argues 
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that the intellect can see God’s essence. He justifies this kind of seeing by the principle 
of causality. First Thomas (ST I, q. 2, a. 1, co.)  proves that the existence of God is 
evident. An existence can be evident in two senses—first, it is self-evident in itself but 
not to us; second, it is self-evident in itself and to us. If we accept that God’s existence is 
self-evident in the second sense, a demonstration is no longer needed. This kind of self-
evidence is already shown plausible in the context of knowledge of God by faith. If self-
evident is understood in the first sense, then demonstration is needed.  
Thomas argues that such demonstration can be proved by effects—demonstration 
a posteriori. “When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from effect, we proceed 
to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect, the existence of its proper cause 
can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every 
effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist” (ST I, q. 2, a. 
2, co.). Therefore, an effect is evidence for the existence of the cause. For him, there are 
five ways to prove God’s existence (ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co). 
The first and “the more manifest way” is the argument from motion. After 
observing series of sensible motions, Thomas (ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co) argues that “it is 
necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone 
understands to be God.” The second way is “from the nature of efficient cause.” 
From the examination of the nature of the efficient cause, “it is necessary to admit a 
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God” (ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co). 
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity. Here, Thomas argues that, 
after seeing that almost everything is contingent, “we postulate that God is a being 
having [in] itself its own necessity…and causing in others their necessity” (ST I, q. 
2, a. 3, co). The fourth is from the gradation to be found in things. Thomas claims 
that “there must be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, 
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God” (ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co).  
The fifth way is from the governance of the world. Seeing the design and order of 
the universe, he argues that it is God “by whom all natural things are directed to their 
end” (ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co).  
From the principle of causality, Thomas proves that sensible effects in the 
universe are proofs of God’s existence who is the prime mover, the first efficient cause, 
the necessary being, the most good and most perfect being, and finally, the intelligent 
designer of everything. Causality, in the mind of Thomas Aquinas, does not presume 
that God is the most and the best. What it actually shows is that God is Ipsum Esse 
Subsistens, that is, God is Subsistent Being Itself. He is the ground and goal of all beings. 
Thomas Aquinas (ST I, q. 25, a. 3, co.) argues that “[t]he divine existence…upon which 
the nature of the power of God is founded, is infinite and is not limited to any genus of 
being…[He] possesses within [Himself] the perfection of all being.”  
 




Theistic evidentialism is a form of evidentialism rooted in Natural Theology 
through which sufficient evidence for belief in God is accessed. Richard Swinburne 
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(1996, 55) argues that “the existence and regular behavior of material objects provide 
good evidence for the existence of God.” He (1996, 68) furthers that “[t]he very 
success of science in showing us how deeply orderly the natural world provides strong 
grounds for believing that there is an even deeper cause of that order.” Order in nature 
is proof of its designer. Order, as an effect, is a hint of its agent, the cause. 
Syllogistically, it can be expressed as: 
 
(1) If there is an effect, then there is a cause.   
(2) There is an effect. 
(3) Therefore, there is a cause. 
(1) If the universe is ordered, then there is an orderer. 
(2) The universe is ordered. 
(3) Therefore, there is an orderer. 
 
Like Swinburne, the atheist-turned-theist philosopher Anthony Flew (2007, 
95) believes that “the most popular and intuitively plausible argument for God’s 
existence is the so-called argument from design.” Flew (2007, 96-112) argues that 
laws of nature—laws that govern the regularities in nature are “mathematically 
precise, universal, and ‘tied together’”— have provenance in God. Following the 
thoughts of some of the world-renowned scientists like A. Einstein, M. Planck, W. 
Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Paul Dirac, he contends that the rationality of 
nature [on the part of science] is related to the mind of God. Flew (2007, 112) 
writes: 
 
Those scientists who point to the Mind of God do not merely advance 
a series of arguments of a process of syllogistic reasoning. Rather, they 
propound a vision of reality that emerges from the conceptual heart of 
modern science and imposes itself on the rational mind. It is a vision that 
I personally find compelling and irrefutable.      
 
Some analytic philosophers of religion like George I. Mavrodes and William L. 
Rowe also argue for the importance of evidence. As examined by Philip L. Quinn 
(2002, 515), these philosophers show that “a proof is supposed to be a discursive 
argument for its conclusion; a proof is also supposed to be a cognitive achievement of 
some sort. To put the point modestly, perhaps a proof is supposed to raise the epistemic 
status of its conclusion above what that status would be in the absence of the proof.” 
Quinn (2002, 516) cites Mavrodes’ argument to show the importance of proof in an 
argument for God’s existence: 
 
(1) Either nothing exists, or God exists. 
(2) Something exists. 
(3) Therefore, God exists.  
 
In his analysis of the argument, Quinn (2002, 516) writes: 
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This argument is a deductively valid disjunctive syllogism. Its second 
premise is obviously true. Since its first premise follows deductively from 
its conclusion, it is a sound argument if God exists. Suppose that God does 
exist. The argument is then a sound argument for the existence of God. 
 
To strengthen the status of proof further, Quinn cites Rowe’s The Cosmological 
Argument’s concluding chapter entitled The Cosmological Argument as a Justification 
for Belief in God. “Like Mavrodes,” Quinn (2002, 518) writes, “Rowe insists that an 
argument must satisfy epistemic conditions if it is to account as a proof for the 
existence of God.” As quoted by Quinn (2002 [Rowe 1975, 254]), below are the five 
necessary conditions for being a proof of God’s existence: 
 
(i) The conclusion asserts or entails (in some fairly obvious way) that 
God exists. (ii) The conclusion must follow from the premises of the 
argument. (iii) The premises of the argument must be true. (iv) The 
premises of the argument are known to be true. (v) The premises are 
known independently of any knowledge of the conclusion.  
 
From Quinn’s examination of Mavrodes’ deductive argument and Rowe’s 
inductive argument, it is conclusive that proof is sufficient to justify belief in God. By 
showing that proof is both deductively and inductively accessible, belief in God can 




Peter Forrest (1997 [2017], 8) notes that reformed epistemology is an 
“influential contemporary rejection of evidentialism due to [Nicholas] Wolterstorff 
(1976) and Plantinga (1983).” Between them, Plantinga “has clearly been the leading 
contemporary advocate of this school of thought in religious epistemology” (Quinn 
2002, 524-525). It is “reformed” because the two leading proponents are heavily 
influenced by reformed thinkers such as John Calvin and Abraham Kuyper (Anthony 
Bolos and Kyle Scott n.d., 3). Calvinist influence—the concept of sensus divinitatis— 
can be gleaned from Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (2000, 126): “[A] believer 
in God might think that there is such a thing as Calvin’s sensus divinitatis [a rational 
faculty], a natural, inborn sense of God or of divinity, that is the origin and source of 
the world’s religions.” Later, this rational faculty will be used by Plantinga in his 
discussion of belief in God as properly basic.    
Wolterstorff (1983, 6) believes that evidentialism is the “form assumed by the 
vision of Enlightenment when it comes to matters of religion.” For him, evidentialists 
advance two claims: (1) “No religion is acceptable unless rational.” (2) “No religion is 
rational unless supported by evidence” (1983, 6). Wolterstorff (1983, 14-15) counters 
this position by claiming that “‘[to] know’ has the sense of acknowledge, as it 
frequently does in the Bible, trusting God is knowing God. To have faith in God is to 
know him; to know God is to have faith in him.” 
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Aside from Wolterstorff and Plantinga, John Hick and William Alston also 
contend that religious belief is rational even without proof.  
Grounded on the fact that experienced-based theistic belief predates all forms of 
proofs of God’s existence that seemingly function as a “conclusion of an inference” in 
order to convince people outside the realm of faith, Hick (1971, 108) argues that the 
proper philosophical approach to “a living and operative belief” is to explore its “actual 
foundations” rather than exploring the “theoretical and non-operative arguments 
subsequently formulated for holding [such belief].” In line with this, it is not the 
propositioned belief that is worth examining because propositions cannot be rational 
or irrational but can only be either true or false. “It is people who are rational or 
irrational, and derivately [sic] their states and their actions, including their acts and 
states of believing” (Hick 1971, 109). While a believer cannot prove that God exists, 
“it may nevertheless be possible for him to show it to be wholly reasonable for him to 
believe that God exists.”  
In a similar vein, Alston (1991, 68) shows that religious experience makes it 
possible to perceive God and that this possibility can be realized. In realizing such 
possibility, he contends that “putative experience of God provides justification for 
beliefs about God, that provides very strong support for supposing that such 
experiences are, at least frequently, genuine perceptions of God” (Alston 1991, 68-69). 
What justifies these beliefs is mystical perception—not inferior to sense-perception—
which “provides a basis for beliefs about God, rather than beliefs about the subject’s 
perceptual achievements” (Alston 1991, 77).         
 
Plantinga’s Notion of Proper Basicality  
 
In his Reason and Belief in God, Plantinga (1983, 73-87) argues that belief in 
God is properly basic, so evidence is not needed to justify such belief. This contention 
is his reaction against the evidentialists who claim that that it is irrational to believe in 
God without sufficient justification for that belief. As a reformed epistemologist, he 
believes that evidence for belief in God is unnecessary and the absence of which does 
not render the same belief unreasonable.  He asks: “Must one have evidence to be 
rational or reasonable in believing in God?” Before answering this question, he (1983, 
75-76) first repudiates the claim of the evidentialists that properly basic beliefs are self-
evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Plantinga (1983, 75) expresses the 
evidentialists’ position as follows: 
 
(2) For any proposition A and person S, A is properly basic for S if and 
only if A is incorrigible for S or self-evident to S.  
 
Plantinga (1983, 75, additions mine), in his criticism of the said proposition, 
writes:  
 
But how could one know a thing like that? What are its credentials? 
Clearly enough, (2) is not self-evident or just obviously true. But if it is 
not, how does one arrive at it? What sorts of arguments would be 
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appropriate? Of course, a foundationalist [therefore, evidentialist] might 
find (2) so appealing he simply takes it to be true, neither offering an 
argument for it nor accepting it on the basis of other things he believes. If 
he does so, however, his noetic structure will be self-referentially 
incoherent. (2) itself is neither self-evident nor incorrigible; hence if he 
accepts (2) as basic, the modern foundationalist violates in accepting it 
the condition of proper basicality he himself lays down.  
 
In short, Plantinga (1983, 76) sees the evidentialists’ proposition as epistemically 
faulty. It is so because proper basicality does not “follow from clearly self-evident 
premises by clearly acceptable arguments.” Clearly, just because one believes in 
something does not mean that she/he has to reasonably ground it on other beliefs. The 
three criteria, therefore, do not guarantee proper basicality. In a way, Plantinga (see 1983, 
76) appears to say that if one remembers—therefore believes—that she/he cooked adobo 
this morning—provided that she/he does not doubt her/his memory—then that memory 
or belief is basic. There is no need for one to anchor that belief on some other rational 
grounds. Basicality itself is the very foundation of such itself.  
If the evidentialists’ understanding of basicality is faulty, what is proper 
basicality then for Plantinga?  He contends that belief in God is properly basic when 
the object (God) of such belief is personally experienced. He (1983, 77) furthers: “my 
being appeared to redly, for example, is both necessary and sufficient [condition] for 
my being justified in taking it as basic that I am appeared to redly.” In the context of 
the one seeing God, this example can be paraphrased: “seeing God, for example, is 
both necessary and sufficient for my being justified in taking it as basic that I am seeing 
God.” After many years, Plantinga (2000, 148) still defends his notion of proper 
basicality: “belief can be properly basic for a person in the sense that it is indeed basic 
for him (he does not accept in on the evidential basis of other propositions) and, 
furthermore, he is justified in holding it in the basic way [epistemic honesty].” While 
there is no fixed criterion of proper basicality, one’s belief can be properly basic in the 
sense that one has an experience of God or is in the conditions that allow him/her to 
know God, such as reading the Bible, having a deeper sense of everything that is, an 
experience of forgiveness, the capacity to love and beloved, and feeling of joy and 
sadness among others. Belief-propositions —“God is calling me,” “God is the source 
of life,” “God loves me,” “God takes good care of me, and “God is a joyful giver” are 
also properly basic. In order to ensure basicality, these experiences must be personally 
meaningful and must not depend on justifying propositions. Although there is no fixed 
criterion for basicality, personal experience validates it.  This personal meaning is 
experience-based. Perhaps, one believes in God by way of a personal encounter with 
Him, by way of conversion, or by way of training. Whatever the case may be, Plantinga 
(2000, 86-87) notes, provided that one’s belief is true, one knows that God exists and 
that is properly basic, that is, meaningful, justified in itself even without evidence.  
For him, the proper way to arrive at basicality is by induction. Plantinga (2000, 
77) notes that the “[c]riteria for proper basicality must be reached from below rather than 
above; they should not be presented ex cathedra but argued to and tested by a relevant 
set of examples.” Plantinga (2000) anticipates that not everyone will agree on the 
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examples he will be showing to justify induction as a proper way to arrive at basicality. 
Nonetheless, he proceeds to show that such examples justify his claim. These examples, 
for him, are very particular to the Christian community. “The Christian community is 
responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs” [referring to the followers of the atheist 
evidentialists Bertrand Russell and Madelyn O’Hare] (Plantinga 2000). 
Plantinga (2000, 78-79) proceeds to prove the claim by enumerating three kinds 
of beliefs from induction: (1) I see a tree [perceptual beliefs]. (2) I had breakfast this 
morning [memory beliefs]. (3) That person is in pain [beliefs ascribing mental states 
to other persons]. (1) (2) (3) are basic provided that the one having these beliefs are 
epistemically faithful to sense experience. Provided that one is indeed so, there is no 
need to justify the beliefs because one’s epistemic honesty guarantees their truth.    
Plantinga (2000, 79) furthers that “although beliefs of this sort are taken 
typically as basic, it would be a mistake to describe them as groundless.” A belief is 
justified for a person at a time if “(a) he is violating no epistemic duties and within his 
epistemic rights in accepting it then and (b) his noetic structure is not defective by 
virtue of his then accepting it. Then my being appeared to in this characteristic way 
(together with other circumstances) is what confers on me the right to hold the belief 
in question; this is what justifies me in accepting it.” Meaning, a belief is justified when 
one is epistemically honest with the content of sense experience. 
Using the same method, Plantinga now attempts to justify belief in God without 
dependence to any evidence. Like one’s workaday experiences [again by induction], 
there are many instances that drive one to believe in God: “guilt, gratitude, danger, a 
sense of God’s presence, a sense that he speaks, perception of various parts of the 
universe” (Plantinga 2000, 81). These experiences, he notes, are not the “simple belief 
that God exists. What we have instead are such beliefs as: (8) God is speaking to me, 
(9) God has created all of this, (10) God disapproves of what I have done, (11) God 
forgives me, and (12) God is to be thanked and praised” (2000, 81). These propositions 
(8-12) are properly basic, showing that God exists. “It is not the relatively high-level 
and general proposition that God exists that is properly basic, but instead propositions 
detailing some of his attributes or actions” (2000, 81). Therefore, both the proposition 
God exists and propositions 8-12 are properly basic.  
 
PLANTINGA’S JUSTIFICATION   
 
The Three Justification-Conferring Conditions 
 
For Plantinga (2000, 82-83), justification-conferring conditions are prima facie 
conditions though which one’s belief —expressed in the proposition (1) God exists 
implied by propositions 8-12 as enumerated above—is reasonably justified. Justification 
may take the form of acceptance or denial. As regards the former, one’s belief in (1) may 
be accepted if relevant arguments for it propositionally verify it. As regards the former, 
one’s belief in (1) may be denied if relevant arguments against it propositionally falsify 
it. Once a theist whose belief in God is properly basic is faced with propositions 
sufficiently relevant to falsify it, “presumably some change is called for. If he accepts 
these propositions more strongly than [the proposition God exists]; presumably he will 
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give the latter up” (Plantinga 2000, 82). Conversely, once an atheist whose disbelief in 
God is properly basic is faced with propositions sufficiently relevant to falsify it, “you 
may cause him to give up a proposition he knows to be true” (2000, 83).  
Plantinga (2000, 85-86) enumerates three kinds of prima facie justification-
conferring conditions: (1) training or teaching, (2) weak/strong justification, and (3) 
“the conditions that confer prima facie justification do not inevitably include belief.”   
A good example for training or teaching is a child’s acceptance of the teaching 
given to her/him. “A child is within his epistemic rights in believing what he is taught 
by his elders” (2000, 85). Another example cited by Plantinga is when someone asks 
for direction from another who knows the place better. Provided that the latter tells the 
former the truth, the former would believe the latter to be telling the truth. One’s belief 
in God is strengthened (justified) by the testimonies of those who believe in God.  
The second justifying condition is propositionally expressed by Plantinga (2000, 
85): “a condition satisfied by a person S and a belief p when S is within his epistemic 
rights in accepting p.” S is justified to believe in p [there is a brown bird] provided that 
S fulfills his epistemic duty—to be honest to the data of experience. This weak 
justification can become a strong one when “the belief in question is true, then I know 
it…I am not merely within my rights in believing that [there is a brown bird]; perhaps 
I have a prima facie obligation to do so [because I truly know it]” (2000, 85). 
The third justifying condition does not “inevitably include belief.” Plantinga 
(2000, 86) writes:  
 
What justifies me in believing that there is a tree present is just that fact 
that I am appeared to in a certain way [that the tree appears to him in a 
certain way]; it is not necessary that I know or believe or consider the fact 
that I am being thus appeared to. What justifies me in believing, on a given 
occasion, that 2+1=3 is the fact that it then seems self-evident to me; there 
is the “clarity and brightness” (Locke) or luminous aura I referred to above. 
But to be justified it is not necessary that I believe, on that occasion, that 
my experience is that of character; I need not so much as raise the question. 
The condition’s being satisfied is sufficient for prima facie justification; my 
knowing and believing that it is satisfied is not necessary. 
 
Here, Plantinga argues that just because something is justified does not 
necessarily mean that one believes. The self-evidence of something does not 
epistemically move someone to believe. Hence, on the contrary, self-evidence is not a 
necessary condition for belief. In this kind of justifying condition, Plantinga reaffirms 
his position that evidence is not needed to reasonably justify one’s belief in God.  For 
him, “belief in God…is not groundless or arbitrary; it is grounded in justification-
conferring conditions” (Plantinga 2000, 91).  
 
The Sensus Divinitatis 
 
Sensus divinitatis [sense of God], Plantinga (2000, 80) notes, “is a tendency or 
disposition to see [God’s] hand in the world about us. More precisely, there is in us a 
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disposition to believe propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this 
vast and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the flower or 
behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches of the universe.” Seventeen 
years after Reason and Belief in God, Plantinga (2000, 148) clarifies that it is this sense 
that produced in a believer theistic belief as basic. 
What guarantees the truth of the said propositions is the sense of God itself 
because this sense is the “truth-aimed” faculty (Plantinga 2000, 126). This sense is 
“triggered or occasioned by a wide variety of circumstances,” including the order and 
beauty of the universe (Plantinga 2000, 145). Once activated, it becomes an assuring 
factor that what is observed epistemically is true and therefore basic. Guilt, a feeling 
that activates the sense of God, is not an evidence for the existence of God, “or for the 
proposition that he is displeased with me. It is rather that in that circumstance—the 
circumstance of my clearly seeing my guilt—I simply find myself with the belief that 
God is disapproving or disappointed” (Plantinga 2000, 146).  
“In this regard, the sensus divinitatis resembles perception, memory, and a 
priori belief [in God]” (Plantinga 2000, 146). Aside from induction, as already noted 
above, this a priori belief prevents Plantinga from accepting the necessity of evidence 
in justifying belief in God. If through induction, proved by propositions 8-12, belief in 
God is properly basic; it is the sense of God that produces theistic belief as basic. 
Hence, Plantinga succeeded in justifying belief in God deductively and inductively 
without recourse to evidence.  
 
CRITIQUE OF PLANTINGA’S POSITION   
 
Plantinga’s Pure Subjectivism  
 
Plantinga’s argument based on basicality—that evidence is not necessary to 
justify belief in God rationally—renders one’s belief purely subjective. First, although 
such belief can be deductively and inductively expressed in a proposition, the only one 
who can confirm its validity is the one claiming to believe that God exists. While 
Plantinga does not question the reality of the world outside his mind, he rejects the 
same reality as a potent evidence for belief in God. Unlike him, Thomas Aquinas, in 
his knowledge of God by science operating under the principle of causality, proves 
that the external world is an effect of the reality that God exists. For the latter, this God 
is the prime mover, the first efficient cause, the necessary being, the most good and 
most perfect being, and finally, the intelligent designer of everything.  
Plantinga overlooks the vitality of the cadence of the universe to rationally 
ground his belief in God. The reality propounded by the theistic evidentialists, 
generally operating through the aid of Natural Theology, is for Plantinga (1983, 76) 
grounded on “faulty epistemology” because the criteria—self-evident, incorrigible, 
evident to the senses—are “self-referentially incoherent.” It is incoherent because he 
believes that the only one who can confirm coherence is the believer herself/himself. 
This coherence is understood as basicality.   
It is only the believer who can validate the basicality of belief in God. Second, 
Plantinga (1983, 78) himself recognizes that there is “no full-fledged criterion of 
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proper basicality.” This means that anyone can claim that belief in God is basic because 
one can seemingly ground it rationally. What assures this justification are epistemic 
honesty and the sensus divinitatis.  
In the paradigm of Thomas Aquinas’ epistemology, specifically in his 
understanding of knowledge of God by faith, Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis can be 
understood as God’s grace. Both Thomas Aquinas and Plantinga agree that it is God 
who is the object of faith. By the power of God, the content of faith—by the act of the 
intellect determined by the will, that faith is a choice—faith is justified. However, 
unlike Plantinga, Thomas Aquinas treats faith itself as evidence. Meaning, as shown 
above, the reality of faith is evidence for the existence of God. 
By completely rejecting both the inductive and deductive evidence for God, 
Plantinga becomes purely subjective in his understanding and justification for the 
belief in God. To escape this intellectual shackle, he introduces the notion of 
justification-conferring conditions.  
 
Justification-Conferring Conditions as Evidence 
 
In order to escape the reality of pure subjectivism,2 Plantinga introduces the 
notion of justification-conferring conditions. These conditions are prima facie 
conditions through which one’s belief is epistemically justified. Through these 
conditions, according to him, belief in God can reasonably be grounded. This 
seemingly self-coherent grounding is grounded on epistemic honesty. One’s epistemic 
honesty is very crucial to basicality because, as Plantinga (2000, 148) notes, “he is 
within his epistemic rights, is not irresponsible, is violating no epistemic of other duties 
in holding that belief in that way [as basic].” 
Plantinga’s understanding of basicality clearly rests on epistemic justification. 
Justification-conferring conditions ground this kind of justification. The three 
justifying conditions —(1) training or teaching, (2) weak/strong justification, and (3) 
“the conditions that confer prima facie justification do not inevitably include belief”—
function as an evidence for belief in God. Hence, Plantinga negates basicality because 
a properly basic belief in God does not demand evidence which justification-
conferring conditions obviously assume. Without justification-conferring conditions 
that serve as an evidence, belief in God as properly basic not only renders a believer 
as purely subjectivist in her/his approach to faith but also makes her/him completely 
irrational. This is because there can be no objective justification through which she/he 
can communicate belief in God in a manner that is comprehensible and not self-
incoherent.       
If belief in God is properly basic, why is there a need to ground it?  If basicality 
reasonably justifies the same belief, why are justification-conferring conditions 
introduced? Clearly, the answer for this is that basicality must be objective—the 
quality of belief that has never been rightfully achieved by Plantinga because of the 
denial of the sufficiency of evidence for belief in God. What Plantinga failed to achieve 
has been achieved by Thomas Aquinas: while evidence is not a necessary condition 
for belief because in itself it is already evidence, there is sufficient evidence for belief 
in God. Thomas Aquinas’ demonstration of the complementary role of knowledge of 
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God by science and knowledge of God by faith renders belief in God objective justified 
by God Himself and the available evidence in the universe. Unlike the evidentialists, 
Thomas Aquinas argues that faith in God—through his exposition of knowledge of 





In light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology, it has been found that 
Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic, that is, evidence is not needed 
to justify such belief, is purely subjective and epistemically inconsistent. It is purely 
subjective because it is only the believer who can justify the reasonability of her/his 
faith and the veracity of the content of the same faith. It is epistemically inconsistent 
because basicality (no need for evidence) still demands grounding by justification-
conferring conditions which epistemically assume the role of evidence.  
Indeed, according to Thomas Aquinas, while evidence is not a necessary 
condition for belief in God because of the reality of knowledge of God by faith, it is 
nonetheless sufficient to justify the same belief because of the reality of knowledge of 
God by science.   
 
NOTES 
     
1. Plantinga clarifies that the Reformed view of belief in God “is not felicitously 
thought of as a version of fideism” (Plantinga 1983, 91). 
2. Plantinga does not want to label his claim as subjectivism but particularism 
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